Thursday, 17 April 2014

Battle of Bibracte, June 58 BC

Ave Caesar... just!

During that day Caesar followed the enemy at the usual interval and pitched his camp three miles from theirs. Next day, as the distribution of rations was due in two days' time and he was only seventeen miles from Bibracte, far the largest and richest town of the Aedui, he thought it advisable to secure his food-supply, and therefore diverged from the route that the Helvetii were following and marched towards the town.

His movements were reported to the enemy by some runaway slaves of Lucius Aemilius, the commander of Caesar's Gallic cavalry. The Helvetii perhaps thought that we were breaking contact with them out of fear, especially as we had declined engagements the day before, although we had the advantage of position; or it may be they were confident of being able to cut us off from access to supplies. In any case they changed their plan, altered the direction of their march, and began to hand upon our rear and harass it.

Observing this, Caesar withdrew to a hill close at hand and sent out his cavalry to meet the enemy's attack. In the meantime he formed his four veteran legions in three lines half-way up the hill, and posted the two recently levied in Italy on the summit with all the auxiliaries, so that the whole of the hillside above him was occupied with troops.

[...] The Helvetii, who were following us with the whole of their transport, now parked it all together, and, after repulsing our cavalry, with a battle-line drawn up in very close order, formed a phalanx and climbed towards our first line. [...]

By throwing down spears from their commanding position the troops easily broke the enemy's phalanx, and then drew their swords and charged.

At length, exhausted by wounds, they [the Helvetii] began to fall back towards a hill about a mile away.

Our men were approaching to dislodge them,

when the fifteen thousand Boii and Tulingi who protected the rear of their column suddenly marched up, attacked us on the right flank, and surrounded us.

Thereupon the Helvetii who had retreated to the hill began to press forward again and renew the battle.

Caesar ordered his veteran legions to march towards the advancing Helvetti,

while the Italian legions he turned to withstand the newly-arrived troops.

Forming a solid line, Legio VII, VIII and X fought back the counter-attacking Helvetii, while Caesar ordered Legio IX to turn to protect their right flank against the advancing Boii and Tulingi.

Under pressure from the vast numbers of Helvetii attackers, Legio VIII on the right of the line and two cohorts of Legio VII on the left were broken.

The Italian legions on the hill held firm against the Boii and Tulingi infantry and cavalry.

Having defeated their Boii and Tulingi opponents, Legio IX faced a threat from the Helvetii to their rear.

Other warriors from the same tribe moved to threaten the flank of Legio X, but their line with the remainder of Legio VI held firm.

Attacked to the front by the Boii and Tulingi and to the flank by the Helvetii, the first of the Italian legions broke, but their countryman held firm on the hill with the auxilia.

Legio IX fought well against the Helvetii who charged after them into the wood.

Caesar ordered Legio VI and X to turn to three sides to combat the remaining Helvetii,

and the Italian legions to counter-attack the Gauls attacking the hill.

The veteran legions held firm.

The attack on the hill was defeated.

Orgetorix could only demonstrate in the face of Legio X.

The remaining Gauls laid down their arms before Caesar and his victorious legions.

[..................................................]

Centuries later, the renowned scholar of ancient Rome, Peter Connolly, passed this judgement on the early stages of Caesar's conquest of Gaul.
It is quite clear from his own accounts of the early part of his war in Gaul that he was making mistakes and the army was managing to get out of [them] and his first three battles were in one way or another errors in judgement... it is only the sheer guts of the Roman soldier and Caesar's own willingness to go into the frontline and to fight next to the blokes to inspire them that actually wins the battle. (Transcribed from The Great Commanders: Caesar, 1993).
Our version of this battle was in keeping with this observation.

References
Caesar, GJ (1951) The Conquest of Gaul. Translated by SA Handford. Penguin Books Ltd., Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England. 283 pp.
Grabsky, P (1993) The Great Commanders: Caesar. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K9H0ihbQPUQ

Saturday, 12 April 2014

Battle of Trebia, December 218 BC

Hannibal: still the greatest soldier of his age

The senate commanded consul Tiberius Sempronius Longus to sail from Sicily to reinforce general, Publius Cornelius Scipio whose forces had been beaten by Hannibal at the Battle of Ticinus, during which Scipio was wounded. Sempronius assembled his two legions at Ariminum south of the Po river and from there marched to Placentia.

The two consuls did not agree on the best plan to deal with the Carthaginian threat.
"...the one consul being dispirited by the battle of the cavalry [Ticinus] and his own wound, wished operations to be deferred: the other having his spirits unsubdued, and being therefore the more impetuous, admitted no delay" (Livius Book XXI, Chap 51,52).
Hannibal
"...received information, that some of the Gauls that lived between the river Trebia and the Po, who had before concluded an alliance with him, had now entered also into terms of treaty with the Romans, he sent away two thousand foot, and a thousand Numidian and Gallic horse, to plunder and lay waste their country. ...the detachment was now returning with their booty, when the Gauls came running to the Roman camp, and implored assistance. Tiberius [Sempronius], who for some time had been impatient to be in action, seized the occasion, and immediately sent away the greatest part of his cavalry, together with a thousand light-armed foot. These troops, ...charged the Numidians and the Gauls that were loaded with the plunder, and forced them to retreat in haste to their intrenchments. [...] Tiberius, being beyond measure elated by his success, was impatient to try the fortune of a general engagement. [...] Publius was fixed in different sentiments. For he had considered himself, that when the troops had first been trained and exercised during the time of winter, they would be able to perform much greater service in the following season... He was persuaded likewise, that the natural levity and perfidious disposition of the Gauls would soon lead them to revolt from their new allies, in case that the Carthaginians should be forced to remain long inactive. [...] Annibal, on the other hand, having formed the same reflections in his mind as Publius had made, ... was led to just the opposite determination, and resolved to engage the enemy without delay" (Polybius Book III Chap VII, p. 258–260).
Reports brought in by his Gallic allies and his assessment of the terrain, determined Hannibal as to his best course of action.
"...when the Gauls, who were the safer spies to ascertain what he wished, as they served in both camps, had brought intelligence that the Romans were prepared for battle, the Carthaginian began to look about for a place for an ambuscade. [...] Between the armies was a rivulet, bordered on each side with very high banks, and covered around with marshy plants, and with the brushwood and brambles with which uncultivated places are generally overspread; ... sufficient to afford a covert even for cavalry..."  (Livius Book XXI, Chap 53–54).
He sent his brother Mago with one thousand foot and horse (as both sources report) to lie in wait in the broken ground near the bank of the river.
"...Mago, having been thus sent off, Hannibal orders the Numidian cavalry to ride up, after crossing the river Trebia by break of day, to the gates of the enemy, and to draw them out to a battle by discharging their javelins at the guards... Sempronius, eager for the contest, let out, on the first tumult raised by the Numidians, all the cavalry, being full of confidence in that part of the forces; then six thousand infantry, and lastly all his army, to the place already determined in his plan (Livius Book XXI, Chap 54).
The Romans pursued the Numidians across the river to the plain on the opposite bank.
"It happened to be the winter season and a snowy day... there was no heat in the bodies of the men and horses thus hastily led out without having first taken food, or employed any means to keep off the cold;... when, in pursuit of the flying Numidians, they entered the water, (and it was swollen by rain in the night as high as their breasts) then in truth the bodies of all, on landing, were so benumbed, that they were scarcely able to hold their arms; and as the day advanced they began to grow faint, both from fatigue and hunger" (Livius Book XXI, Chap 54). 
The armies faced one another across the frozen plain, the Romans at right having just crossed the swollen Trebia River.

Sempronius formed his army in the classic Roman manner: cavalry and Italians on the right, Gallic allies on the left and legions in the centre.

Hannibal's dispositions faced off the Romans: Carthaginian cavalry on the left, Numidians  on the right, Gauls in front of his Spanish and Carthaginian infantry, with an elephant flanking the Gauls on each side.

Both armies advanced to battle; seen from the Roman lines (above) and from our 'eye in the sky' (below).

The Gallic allies of each side charged in.

The early stages of the battle seen from three views: slightly elevated, eye level and 'eye in the sky'.

First blood Carthaginians; their superior cavalry defeated their Roman foes after two turns of combat.

Hannibal's light infantry got the better of their Roman velites foes in a 'firefight' of spears! 

Hannibal's Gauls crashed into the Hastati, taking but a few losses (a die roll of one for the determination of 'permanent losses' is very good; i.e. no losses).

Meanwhile their countrymen overcome two of the warbands allied to the Romans (a die roll of five and six for the determination of 'permanent losses' is not good). Clearly they were suffering greatly from the cold and lack of a hearty breakfast!

They did not like being sprayed with missiles from those sneaky Numidian cavalry either (another die roll of six for the determination of permanent losses. I was on fire; in the wrong way)!

A heartening sight for Sempronius as his Gallic allies defeat one of Hannibal's units of elephants,...

but then charged impetuously to "death" at the hands of the Numidians!

Success too for the last Roman-allied warband.

On the Roman right, defeat of the Italian cavalry opened up that flank...

at the same time, above and below, Hannibal’s trap was sprung. The ambush, lead by his brother Mago, emerged from the woods on the Romans' left flank.

It was all down to the legions as the last of the Gallic warbands was driven off by Numidians and Hannibal's Gauls.

This is what a surrounded Roman army looks like:
from the Carthaginian side,

in the clinches as the Spanish and Carthaginian infantry crashed into the line of Hastati,

 from the northern perspective,

 and c/- the 'eye in the sky'!

Having held out bravely against overwhelming numbers, the left-most unit of Hastiti broke. It's all over (50% of the army VDU reached).

The Numidians get perilously close to Sempronius; fortunately unattached commanders are not combat targets under Impetus rules!

This is what a defeated Roman army looks like!

This, our third game using the Impetus rules and second attempt at an historical re-fight, was another enjoyable and satisfying one that produced an historically 'reasonable' outcome.

These ancient battles/games are proving to be a fine 'interlude' between our Napoleonic re-fights and campaign games. Napoleonics will always be my/our first and chief reason for being in the hobby, but these have sparked my interest in the classical era and I'm enjoying developing more in-depth knowledge of the period through reading, devising scenarios, playing the games and writing these reports!

Next stop: Bibracte 58 BC.

References

Livius, T (1887) The History of Rome: Books Nine to Twenty Six. Translated by D Spillman and C Edmonds. Book XXI, Chap 46–57, pp. 744–756. George Hill & Sons, London. https://archive.org

Polybius (1823) The General History of Polybius, Translated from the Greek by Mr. Hampton. Vol. I. Printed by W. Baxter, for J. Parker; and G. and W. H. Whittaker, Ave Maria Lane, London, Oxford. Fifth Edition. Book III, Chap VII, pp. 258–267. https://archive.org